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MEASURING POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
KRISTOPHER TAPP
Abstract. In 2016, a Wisconsin court struck down the state assembly
map due to unconstitutional gerrymandering. If this ruling is upheld by
the Supreme Court’s pending 2018 decision, it will be the fist successful
political gerrymandering case in the history of the United States. The
efficiency gap formula made headlines for the key role it played in this
case. Meanwhile, the mathematics is moving forward more quickly than
the courts. Even while the country awaits the Supreme Court decision,
alternative versions of the efficiency gap formula have been proposed,
analyzed and compared. Since much of the relevant literature appears
(or will appear) in law journals, we believe that the general math au-
dience might find benefit in a concise self-contained overview of this
application of mathematics that could have profound consequences for
our democracy.
1. introduction
Partisan gerrymandering means the manipulating of voting district bound-
aries for the advantage of one political party. Although the Supreme Court
has indicated that extreme partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional, it
failed to throw out the particular state maps under consideration in Davis
v. Bandemer (1986), Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) and LULAC v. Perry
(2006). Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the Court had found “no
discernible and manageable standard for adjudicating political gerryman-
dering claims,” but his opinion left the door open for future gerrymandering
cases by enumerating the properties that he believed a manageable stan-
dard would require. Motivated by Kennedy’s criteria, Stephanopoulos and
McGhee proposed their efficiency gap formula to measure the degree of par-
tisan gerrymandering in an election [7],[11]. Their formula was one key to
the plaintiffs’ success in the Gill v. Whitford (2016) case, in which a Wis-
consin court struck down the state assembly map. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court, with a decision expected in June 2018.
Meanwhile, alternative versions of the efficiency gap formula have been
proposed and studied by McGhee, Nagle, Cover and others. Our purpose is
to survey the mathematical (rather than legal) aspects of theses works, and
provide examples, novel illustrations and a few new results to support our
conclusion that one of the new alternatives is ultimately preferable to the
original efficiency gap formula.
Date: February 23, 2018.
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2. A simple example
Redistricting matters! Image a simple state with 50 voters, 30 loyal to
the red party and 20 to the blue party. Figure 1 illustrates three possible
ways to partition these voters into 5 districts.
Figure 1. Three ways to divide 50 voters into 5 districts
Let V denote the proportion of votes received by the red party and S the
proportion of districts (also called seats) won by the red party. Assume full
voter turnout, so that V = 0.6. Plan 1 is proportional, which means that
S = V. But the red party would prefer plan 2 with S = 1, while the blue
party would prefer plan 3 with S = 0.4. Notice that plan 1 is the least
competitive, which would make for boring election night television.
Plan 3 exhibits telltale features of a map that was gerrymandered by the
blue party. The opponent red voters were packed into two districts where
they wasted votes by having far more than the required 50%, and the rest
of the red opponent voters were cracked (thinly distributed) into districts
where they lacked a majority, and therefore wasted their votes on losing
candidates. In general, gerrymandering involves the intertwined strategies
of packing (wasting opponent votes on unnecessary super-majorities) and
cracking (wasting opponent votes on losing candidates). It’s all about wast-
ing opponent votes. We will use this example to test each gerrymander-
detection method discussed in this paper.
Plan 3 is the best that the blue party can do because in an election with 5
districts of equal voter-turnout, the pair (V,S) will lie in the interior of one
of the 6 horizontal lines illustrated in Figure 2 (left). The left ends of these
horizontal lines indicate that the red party needs more than 10% of the votes
to capture one seat, more than 20% to capture two seats, etc. The right
ends indicate that the blue party has exactly these same restrictions. These
lines all lie in the parallelogram P with vertices {(0, 0), (.5, 0), (.5, 1), (1, 1)}
illustrated in Figure 2 (right).
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Figure 2. All possible (V,S)-outcomes lie in P.
3. Setup
In the remainder of this paper, we consider a simple model of a state
divided into n districts with exactly two political parties, called A (red) and
B (blue). If i ∈ {1, ..., n} and P ∈ {A,B}, we define:
V Pi = the number of votes cast for party P in district i
SPi =
{
1 if party P won district i
0 otherwise.
ΓP =
{
i | SPi = 1
}
= the set of districts won by party P .
Omitted superscripts and subscripts will be interpreted as summed over.
For example, V P denotes the number of votes cast for party P in all districts,
Vi denotes the number of votes cast by both parties in district i, and V
denotes the total number of statewide votes cast. With this convention,
notice that SP is the number of seats won by party P (which explains the
variable name), while S = n.
As in the previous section, we will use the calligraphy font for the propor-
tion of votes and seats won by party A, and a subscript m for the marginal
version of these measurments (the amount above 12):
V = V
A
V
, Vm = V − 1
2
, S = S
A
S
, Sm = S − 1
2
.
In the examples from the previous section, party A received 60% of the
statewide vote, so V = 0.6 and Vm = 0.1.
In this paper, we will only consider measurements and methods that de-
tect gerrymandering purely from the district-outcome-data:
D = ((V A1 , V B1 ), ..., (V An , V Bn )) .
This restriction forces us to ignore geometric measurements, like squared
perimeter divided by area, that attempt to flag bizarrely shaped districts as
gerrymandered, as well as very promising recent computer modeling work
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by the group Quantifying gerrymandering @Duke University. For example,
[4] argues that the outcome of the Wisconsin state assembly election was
extremely pro-Republican compared to a large number of simulated elections
using district maps randomly sampled among the set of maps that respect
geometric/geographical criteria at least as well as the actual map did.
The plaintiffs in recent gerrymandering cases didn’t have to choose, but
rather introduced geometric and statistical evidence in addition to evidence
based on the types of measurements discussed in this paper.
District maps are legally required to have approximately equipopulus dis-
tricts. We henceforth make the slightly stronger assumption that the dis-
tricts have equal voter turnout:
The equal turnout hypothesis: Vi = V/n for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
This hypothesis insures that (V,S) lies in the interior ofP (the parallelogram
in Figure 2). In fact, the set of possible (V,S)-outcomes fillPmore and more
densely as V, n→∞. The right and left edges of P represent outcomes that
would only be possible if a tied district were awarded to one of the parties.
We henceforth only consider elections without any tied districts, so that
SA + SB = S (all seats are won).
4. Symmetry methods
In this section, we review the basic idea of the symmetry methods that
dominated the literature on gerrymander-detection through the LULAC v.
Perry (2006) Supreme Court decision.
An election result determines a single ordered pair (V,S) ∈ P. But the
district-outcome-data D = ((V A1 , V B1 ), ..., (V An , V Bn )) allows one to deter-
mine what value of (V,S) would have resulted had there been a uniform
voter opinion shift in favor or against party A. More precisely, for any
m ∈ Z, suppose that exactly m voters in each district had switched from
B to A (interpreted as vice-versa if m is negative). Define (Vm,Sm) ∈ P
as the outcome that would have resulted from the corresponding modified
district-outcome-data
Dm =
(
(V A1 +m,V
B
1 −m), ..., (V An +m,V Bn −m)
)
,
with voter-counts less than zero interpreted as zero and voter-counts larger
than Vi interpreted as Vi.
There are more sophisticated and more reasonable ways to model a “uni-
form” shift in voter opinion, say in favor of party A. For example, voters
could be flipped one at a time from party B to A, with all party B voters in
all district being equally likely to be the next to flip (see [9]); this method
avoids the issue of voter counts going below zero and above Vi. But our
simple additive model suffices to demonstrate the key ideas here.
The set {(Vm,Sm) | m ∈ Z} is a simulated seats-votes curve. For each
possible value of V, it shows the portion of seats that party A would have
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won if a uniform shift in voter opinions had caused them to received that
fraction of the votes.
Figure 3. Seats-votes curves for the plans from Figure 1
Figure 3 illustrates the simulated seats-votes curve for the district plans
from Figure 1 (with each circle in Figure 1 representing 1000 voters rather
than 1 voter). Only plan 2 is fair in the sense that its curve is symmetric
about the point (.5, .5). In the actual election, party A won 100% of the
seats with 60% of the votes, but party B would have received the same
reward – 100% of the seats – if they had been the party who received 60%
of the votes. This district map treats the two parties equally.
Plan 1 exhibits bias in favor of party A (red), while plan 3 exhibits bias in
favor of party B (blue). There are several precise methods in the literature
used to measure bias – how much each graph fails to be symmetric about the
point (.5, .5). The simplest is just the graph’s height above (.5, .5), which
equals 0.1 of Plan 1 and equals −0.1 for Plan 3. So a simulated voter shift
to V = .5 causes party A receives 60% of the seats with plan 1 and 40% of
the seats with plan 3. There is some some legal weight behind the principle
that a party receiving more than half the votes should receive at least half
of the seats. The actual outcome of plan 3 violated this principle, as did the
simulated outcome of plan 1.
In addition to bias, another commonly discussed measurement is the re-
sponsiveness of a seats-votes curve, which usually means its average rate of
change over an interval like say V ∈ [.45, .55]. High responsiveness means
that the districts are more competitive, so that small changes in voter pref-
erence have larger effects on the number of seats obtained, which is usually
thought of as a desirable property.
For example, ongoing legal challenges to the Pennsylvania congressional
map after the 2012 election are based not just on its bias in favor of Re-
publicans, but also on its low responsiveness. The Republicans won 13 of
the 18 seats with only about 49% of the statewide vote, and the simulated
seats-votes curve was nearly constant on V ∈ [.4, .6], which means that the
Democrats could not improve their unfair situation even by winning more
votes.
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Our short and simple discussion in this section doesn’t do justice to the
abundance of literature on symmetry measurements of seats-votes curves.
There are piles of papers containing more sophisticated ways to model uni-
form voter shifts, construct seats-votes curves, measure their deviation from
being symmetric about (.5, .5), perform statistical analyses, and anchor
the measurements to legal principles. For an expanded view, we recom-
mend [9],[5],[6] and references therein.
These symmetry-based measurements of gerrymandering failed to impress
a majority of the Supreme Court justices in cases up to and including LU-
LAC v. Perry (2006), partly because they are rooted in speculative and
somewhat arbitrary counterfactual simulations. This prompted the inven-
tion of the efficiency gap formula, which measures the degree of gerryman-
dering based on the counting of wasted votes.
5. The efficiency gap
As discussed in Section 2, gerrymandering boils down to forcing voters
in the opponent party to waste votes, so a natural fairness principle is to
require that the two parties waste about the same number of votes. There
are two types of wasted votes: “losing votes” cast for a losing candidate,
and “excess votes” above the 50% required to win a district. So the number
of votes wasted by party P in district i equals:
(5.1) WPi =
{
V Pi if party P lost district i (losing votes)(
V Pi − Vi2
)
if party P won district i (excess votes)
Recall the convention that omitted superscripts and subscripts are inter-
preted as summed over, so WP equals the total number of votes wasted by
party P in all districts. McGhee defined the efficiency gap in [7] as
(5.2) EG =
WB −WA
V
,
which is just the difference in the number of votes wasted by the two parties,
divided by the total number of voters.
The goal of gerrymandering is to waste more votes from the opponent
party than from one’s own party, so EG is designed to measure the extent
to which this occurred. If EG is positive (party B wasted more votes),
then the efficiency gap is evidence that party A manipulated the district
boundaries for political gain. Similarly, a negative efficiency gap is evidence
that party B manipulated the map.
Figure 4 illustrates EG for the example maps from Section 2. All three
plans have |EG | > 0.08, which Stephanopoulos and McGhee proposed as
an indicator of gerrymandering in state assembly elections.
The EG represents a fairness principle that is sometime inconsistent with
the symmetry principle of the previous section; for example, plan 2 has a
symmetric seats-votes curve, but yet is rated by EG as highly gerrymandered
by the red party.
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Figure 4. The efficiency gap of the plans from Figure 1
Notice that −0.5 ≤ EG ≤ 0.5 because in each district half of all votes are
wasted, and the extreme cases occur when all of the statewide wasted votes
come from a single party.
A couple of weaknesses of EG are apparent immediately from Equa-
tion 5.2, but the plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitford successfully countered ar-
guments that the defence levied based upon these weaknesses:
• EG depends on the election outcome (unlike compactness measure-
ments that depend only on the map), and is volatile in competi-
tive races. For example, if all districts are highly competitive and
a single party happens by chance to win all of the districts, then
EG would provide strong evidence that the winning party manipu-
lated the map. To counter this complaint, the plaintiffs showed that
Wisconsin’s high EG persisted in computer-simulated elections with
random swings.
• Demographic factors can cause EG to be high. For example, Democrats
tend to be packed into cities where they waste votes by having
far more than the majority needed to elect the Democratic can-
didate. Lawyers for the defense argued that Wisconsin’s high EG is
explained by demographics rather than manipulated district bound-
aries. The plantiffs counted with computer simulations showing that
the observed EG is high compared to the average EG of simulated
elections in large numbers of random computer-generated district
maps [2].
McGhee made the key observation that EG depends on much less infor-
mation than its definition suggests:
Lemma 5.1 (McGhee [7]). EG = Sm − 2 · Vm.
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For example in 2016, the Republicans held 65% of the state assembly seats
in Wisconsin (Sm = 0.15) despite receiving only 52% of the statewide vote
(Vm = 0.02). Assuming equal turnout, this is the only information needed
to compute that EG = 0.11 (here A=Republicans and B=Democrats). It
might be surprising that a district-by-district tally of wasted votes is not
required. The lemma also gives a faster way to calculate and understand
the results in Figure 4 without the need to tally wasted votes.
Proof. Equation 5.1 becomes:
(5.3) WPi = V
P
i − SPi ·
Vi
2
= V Pi − SPi ·
V
2S
,
so the total number of votes wasted by party P equals:
WP =
n∑
i=1
WPi = V
P − SP · V
2S
.
Therefore:
EG =
WB −WA
V
=
V B − V A
V
− 1
2
· S
B − SA
S
= −2Vm + Sm.

The fairness principle that EG should be small becomes:
(5.4) EG ∼= 0 ⇐⇒ Sm ∼= 2 · Vm,
which conflicts with the principle of proportionality (Sm ∼= Vm). For ex-
ample, if a party wins 60% of the statewide vote, proportionality requires
them to win about 60% of the seats, but achieving a zero efficiency gap re-
quires them to win 70% of the seats. Thus, proportionality is replaced with
a winner’s double bonus principle: the winner deserves a seat margin equal
to twice the vote margin.
The plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitford argued that this double bonus is nor-
mative because the factor 2 matches historical data (see [13] and Figure 5
of [12]) and because the principle is derived from the canonical activity of
equating wasted votes (although the counting and equating of wasted votes
here involved some arbitrary decisions that we will soon discuss). They
might also have mentioned that EG = 0 is a visually appealing centerline
of P; More precisely, Figure 5 shows that for a given value of S, the choice
of V that makes the efficiency gap vanish is half way between its allowable
extremes. The double bonus “looks canonical” because the edges of P also
have slope 2.
On the other hand, the double bonus does not seem to emerge from any
natural probability model. The most naive non-state-specific model would
assume the parties are uniformly distributed through the state. There are
various ways to incorporate random noise into such a model, but with a
large state population, such models predict that the majority party almost
always takes all the seats.
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Figure 5. EG = 0 is a visually natural centerline of P.
Lemma 5.1 reveals the efficiency gap’s most serious deficiency: when one
party has a sufficiently large majority, the efficiency gap is guaranteed to
indicate that the minority party manipulated the map, regardless of how
the map was drawn. More precisely, when party A has over 75% of the
statewide vote (Vm > .25), Lemma 5.1 implies that EG < 0, which indicates
that party B manipulated the map. In fact:
(5.5) Vm > .25 + x⇒ EG < −2x.
This limitation renders the efficiency gap useless in lopsided elections.
McGhee and Stephanopoulos observed that in the past several decades
there have been almost no congressional or state house elections with Vm >
.25 [12]. Nonetheless, we believe that a robust mathematical formula should
correctly handle extreme cases.
Before fixing this deficiency with a better formula, we will highlight more
things that EG gets (sort of) right.
6. The efficiency gap and competitiveness
LE
Does the EG ∼= 0 principle prevent a partisan map-making
team from packing and cracking its opponents? The answer
is yes, provided one is willing to precisely define a “packed
district” as a district won with more than 75% of the vote,
and a “cracked district” as a district lost with between 25% and 50% of
the vote. To understand these cut-off values here, notice that any district
in which the winning party has exactly 75% of the vote is neutral - such a
district contributes zero to the efficiency gap because the wasted votes are
evenly split between the parties, as shown in the figure on the right.
A district won with more than 75% of the vote contributes evidence that
the losing party manipulated the map (by packing the winning party), while
a district won with less than 75% of the vote contributes evidence that the
winning party manipulated the map (by cracking the losing party).
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This discussion can be reframed in terms of competitiveness by defining:
Ci =
|V Ai − V Bi |
Vi
, CP = AVG
{
Ci | i ∈ ΓP
}
, C = AVG {Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} .
That is, Ci ∈ [0, 1] denotes the competitiveness of district i, defined as
the proportion of the vote by which the district was won, CP denotes the
average competitiveness of P -won districts, and C denote the average com-
petitiveness of all districts. Notice that Ci = .5 for a neutral district that
contributes zero to the efficiency gap. The efficiency gap penalizes the win-
ner of a competitive district (0 < Ci < .5) for cracking the loser, and it
penalizes the loser of a non-competitive district (.5 < Ci < 1) for packing
the winner. In fact, the additive contribution to EG from district i equals
± (Ci − 12), which lead Cover to observe:
Proposition 6.1 (Cover [3]). The efficiency gap is the seat-share-weighted
difference of the average of the amounts by which the competitiveness of
districts won by parties A and B differs from 12 :
EG =
(
1
2
− Sm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SB
S
(
CB − 1
2
)
−
(
1
2
+ Sm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SA
S
(
CA − 1
2
)
.
Proof. The efficiency gap equals the average waste-gap of the districts:
EG =
WB −WA
V
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
WBi −WAi
Vi
.
The waste-gap in a single district is linearly related to its competitiveness:
WBi −WAi
Vi
=
{
Ci − 12 if i ∈ ΓB
−Ci + 12 if i ∈ ΓA.
Thus,
EG =
1
n
∑
i∈ΓB
(
Ci − 1
2
)
−
∑
i∈ΓA
(
Ci − 1
2
)
=
(
SB
S
)
·AVG
{
Ci − 1
2
| i ∈ ΓB
}
−
(
SA
S
)
·AVG
{
Ci − 1
2
| i ∈ ΓA
}
,
from which the result follows. 
The Gill v. Whitford majority was swayed by evidence that Democrat-
won districts were far less competitive than Republican-won districts, in-
dicating that Republican map-makers packed Democrats into safe districts.
They regarded this differential competitiveness evidence as independent from
the efficiency gap evidence. But Proposition 6.1 shows that the efficiency gap
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is (sort of) related to differential competitiveness. The simplest relationship
is:
(6.1) Sm = 0⇒ EG = 1
2
(CB − CA),
so parties who win equal numbers of seats are required to win equally com-
petitive districts on average. The general relationship is more complicated
because EG measures weighted differential competitiveness. A picture helps.
For any fixed value of Sm, the equation EG = 0 is graphed in the CACB-
plane as the line through (.5, .5) with
slope =
.5 + Sm
.5− Sm =
SA
SB
.
This slope, coming from the weighting, helps the party who won more
seats, as can be seen in the graphs for plans 1 and 3 (from Section 2) pictured
in Figure 6. In plan 1, all districts were won unanimously (CA = CB = 1),
but even though the parties won equally competitive districts, the score
EG = −0.1 provides evidence that the minority blue party manipulated
the map. In plan 3, party A (red) won two unanimous districts (CA = 1)
while party B (blue) won three fairly competitive districts (CB = 1/3). The
weighting helps the winning blue party a bit but not enough; the efficiency
gap turned out negative enough to indicate that they manipulated the map.
Figure 6. The EG visualized as a weighted differential com-
petitiveness in plans 1 and 3.
7. The weighted efficiency gap
The dissenting judge in Gill v. Whitford criticized how the EG formula
counts excess votes. An “excess vote” is supposed to mean a vote beyond
what’s needed to win a district. If a party wins a district with 60% of the
vote, the EG formula counts 10% of their votes as wasted. But shouldn’t
20% of their votes count as wasted, since winning really only required more
votes than the 40% received by the losing party? If we agree with this judge
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that an excess vote should mean a vote beyond the number received by
the losing party, then we must alter the formula to double all excess vote
counts. This is the λ = 2 case of Nagle’s weighted efficiency gap formula,
which counts excess votes with an arbitrary weight λ ∈ R+:
WPi (λ) =
{
V Pi if i /∈ ΓP (losing votes)
λ ·
(
V Pi − Vi2
)
if i ∈ ΓP (excess votes),
EGλ =
WB(λ)−WA(λ)
V
.
In our opinion, λ ∈ {1, 2} are the only natural cases, but there is no
harm in allowing an arbitrary weight. The weighted version of Lemma 5.1
becomes:
Lemma 7.1 (Nagle [10]). EGλ = Sm − (1 + λ) · Vm.
Proof. The above weighted definition of wasted votes becomes:
WPi (λ) = V
P
i − SPi ·
(
λ
V
2S
+ (1− λ)V Pi
)
,
so the total number of votes wasted by party P equals:
(7.1) WP (λ) =
n∑
i=1
WPi (λ) = V
P − λSP · V
2S
+ (λ− 1) ·
∑
i∈ΓP
V Pi .
The contributions from the first two terms simplify as in the λ = 1 special
case, giving:
EGλ = −2Vm + λ · Sm + (λ− 1) · (X (B,B)−X (A,A)) ,
where X (X,Y ) = 1V ·
∑
i∈ΓY
(
V Xi
)
is the proportion of voters with these
two properties: voting for party X and living in a district won by party Y .
Using the relations:
X (A,A) + X (B,A) = 1
2
+ Sm, X (B,A) + X (B,B) = 1
2
− Vm,
we see that
(7.2) X (B,B)−X (A,A) = −Vm − Sm,
which completes the proof. 
In particular,
EG2 = Sm − 3 · Vm,
which is a winner’s triple bonus. Proportionality advocates prefer to step in
the other direction towards the choice λ = 0, which corresponds to counting
only losing votes:
EG0 = Sm − Vm.
But legal arguments based on the principal EG0 ∼= 0 would not hold up
because the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that political parties do
not have a right to proportional representation.
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A district with competitiveness Ci =
1
λ+1 is neutral – it contributes zero
to the efficiency gap. Although this cutoff value now depends on λ, the
logic remains the same: the EGλ measurement penalizes the winner of a
competitive district (0 < Ci <
1
λ+1) for cracking the loser, and it penalizes
the loser of a non-competitive district ( 1λ+1 < Ci < 1) for packing the
winner. In fact, the weighted version of Proposition 6.1 is:
Proposition 7.2 (Cover [3]).
EG =
(
1
2
− Sm
)(
λ+ 1
2
· CB − 1
2
)
−
(
1
2
+ Sm
)(
λ+ 1
2
· CA − 1
2
)
.
Proof. The waste-gap in a single district is:
WBi −WAi
Vi
=
{
λ+1
2 Ci − 12 if i ∈ ΓB
−λ+12 Ci + 12 if i ∈ ΓA.
The results now follow as in the proof of Proposition 6.1. 
For any fixed values of λ and Sm, the equation EGλ = 0 is graphed in the
CACB-plane as the line through
(
1
λ+1 ,
1
λ+1
)
with slope=0.5+Sm0.5−Sm =
SA
SB
. In
particular, Equation 6.1 remains true for arbitrary values of λ.
Several authors consider EG1’s cutoff value of Ci = 1/2 to be a flaw,
complaining that it “fetishizes three-to-one landslide districts”[1]. We agree
that EG2’s cutoff value of Ci = 1/3 seems to be more reasonable – a district
should probably count as packed if it’s won with between 66% and 75% of
the vote, but we acknowledge that there’s no canonical choice for the cutoff.
Some cutoff is necessary for any formula that is additive over the districts
and attempts to penalize both packing (losing by too much) and cracking
(winning by too little).
In summary, EG2 yields a more reasonable competitiveness cutoff than
EG1, and its “winner’s triple bonus” might appeal to advocates of compet-
itive elections, but it exacerbates the main problem: EG1 is worthless for
elections in which one party received more than 75% of the vote, while EG2
is worthless above 66%.
8. The relative efficiency gap
It is possible to solve all of these problems at once with an elegant relative
version of the efficiency gap formula. This idea was first proposed by Nagle
in [10]. We will call it the relative efficiency gap:
REGλ =
WB(λ)
V B
− W
A(λ)
V A
∈ [−1, 1].
It measures the difference between the proportions of their votes that the
two parties wasted. The idea is to require the parties to waste about the
same proportion of their votes rather than the same number of votes. For
example, it is compelling to regard Plan 1 of Figure 1 as fair because the
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parties waste the same proportion of their votes (even though they don’t
waste the same number of votes).
As before, we allow λ to be an arbitrary positive constant, even though
we think λ ∈ {1, 2} are the only important cases.
Nagle called EGλ “party-centric” and REGλ “voter-centric.” Making the
efficiency gap small “equalizes the aggregate harm done to a party,” whereas
making the relative efficiency gap small “equalizes the average effectiveness
of voters of like mind.” In other words, REGλ ∼= 0 means that a randomly
selected voter from party A is just as likely to have wasted his/her vote as
a randomly selected voter from party B. This distinction is legally relevant
because the Constitution grants rights to individuals not parties.
The global formula for REGλ depends not only on Vm and Sm, but also
on the competitiveness measurement C defined in Section 6:
Proposition 8.1 (Cover [3]).
REGλ =
Sm − (λ+ (1− λ)C)Vm
2
(
1
2 + Vm
) (
1
2 − Vm
)
Proof. Equation 7.1 gives:
WP (λ)
V P
= 1− λ
2
· S
P /S
V P /V
+ (λ− 1)X (P, P )
V P /V
,
with X defined as the proof of Lemma 7.1. Subtracting gives:
REGλ =
λ
2
(
Sm − Vm(
1
2 + Vm
) (
1
2 − Vm
))+(λ−1)·(12 + Vm) · X (B,B)− (12 − Vm) · X (A,A)(1
2 + Vm
) (
1
2 − Vm
) .
The red numerator above equals:
1
2
(X (B,B)−X (A,A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Vm−Sm by Eq. 7.2
) + Vm · (X (A,A) + X (B,B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1
2
(C+1)
),
where the second underscored equality recognizes that the proportion of all
votes that were cast for winning candidates depends linearly on the competi-
tiveness. Making these substitution and simplifying completes the proof. 
We first consider the case λ = 1, in which the dependence on C disappears:
(8.1) REG1 =
1
2
(
Sm − Vm(
1
2 + Vm
) (
1
2 − Vm
)) .
Figure 7 shows the graph of REG1 over the domain P. The cyan line in the
figure shows the slice Vm = 0, along which REG1 is a linear function of Sm.
The green lines in the figure show that
REG1 = 0 ⇐⇒ Vm = Sm,
so the REG1 ∼= 0 principal is consistent with proportionality.
Notice that REG1 is defined on all of the boundary of P except the two
points (Vm,Sm) = ±(.5, .5) illustrated in yellow. What is the limit of REG1
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as (Vm,Sm) approaches either of these two points along a line in P? It
depends on the choice of the line. All values between −.5 and .5 can be
obtained as limits (including the value 0 along the green line).
Figure 7. the graph of REG1 over the domain P
We saw in Equation 5.5 that EG is useless for lopsided elections, but
REG1 fares much better in this regard, provided the number of districts is
reasonably large (Wisconsin has 99 state assembly districts). A tiny party
without enough votes to capture a single seat would be guaranteed to waste
all of their votes regardless of the map. But as soon as both parties have
enough votes to capture a seat or two each, it becomes possible to imagine
voters distributed between districts so that the two parties waste about the
same proportion of their votes. The lopsided election problem disappears
entirely in the limit as n → ∞, which corresponds to graphing REG1 over
the domain P as done in Figure 7. REG1 attains all valued between −.5
and .5 along every “fixed Vm” line in P.
The other natural choice is λ = 2:
(8.2) REG2 =
Sm − (2− C)Vm
2
(
1
2 + Vm
) (
1
2 − Vm
) .
In particular:
(8.3) REG2 = 0 ⇐⇒ Sm = (2− C)Vm,
which elegantly interpolates between proportionality (in the maximally un-
competitive C = 1 extreme) and the winner’s double bonus principal (in the
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maximally competitive C = 0 extreme). So the winner gets an up-to-double
bonus, but only when the districts are competitive enough that the outcome
could be attributed in part to random luck.
Figure 8 shows the graph of REG2. The dependence on C makes it a
multi-valued function over P; the heights of the silver bottom graph and
the gold top graph over a point (Vm,Sm) ∈ P are respectively its infimum
and supremum among all elections with that outcome. A section of the gold
graph is cut away to make the silver graph below it visible.
The cyan line in the figure shows something apparent from Equation 8.2:
along the slice Vm = 0, REG2 is single-valued (which means the infimum
equals the supremum), and is a linear function of Sm.
max
min
Figure 8. the graph of REG2 over the domain P
In fact REG2 is also single-valued over the boundary of P, which is why
the gold and silver graphs seem to join together along their edges. To veri-
fying this (and also to create Figure 8) one requires the following technical
lemma about the range of possible C-values corresponding to any point
(Vm,Sm) ∈ P, whose proof we leave to the reader:
Lemma 8.2. For any fixed Sm ∈
[−12 , 12], the pair (Vm, C) lies in the tilted
rectangle pictured in Figure 9.
9. Comparing the measurements as functions on P
Among the gerrymander detection measurements considered in this pa-
per, the most important are: 2 ·EG, REG1 and REG2 (here we doubled EG
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Figure 9. The constrains on {Vm,Sm, C}
so that all three measurements have the same range [−1, 1]). In this sec-
tion, we illustrate the differences between these measurements considered as
functions on P.
First we highlight what they have in common: the three measurements
agree when the voters are split 50-50 between the two parties (when Vm = 0),
as illustrated by the cyan line in Figures 7 and 8. In Wisconsin, Vm was
close enough to zero that the three methods nearly agree.
The methods disagree in lopsided situations; the limit version of this
statement is the observation that they disagree along the boundary of P.
The measurements’ values along the edges of P are given in Figure 10. In
our opinion, EG and REG2 get it right along the left and right edges: both
equal 1 along the left edge (where party A has the most seats possible for
their given vote share) and they equal −1 along the right edge (where they
have the fewest).
The yellow points (Vm,Sm) = ±(.5, .5) in Figure 10 are non-removable
singularities for REG1 and REG2 because the limits along the horizontal
and vertical edges don’t match up at these points. Because of this feature,
they give more reasonable results than EG near the yellow points. Consider
outcomes near (.5, .5), which means party A receives almost all the votes
and wins almost all the seats. In such a case, 2 · EG ∼= −1 accuses the
minority blue party of manipulating the map, REG1 ∈ [−.5, .5] is willing to
accuse either party of cheating, and REG2 ∈ [−1, 0] accuses either the blue
party or nobody of cheating. It might not be clear what’s fair here, but EG
clearly gets it wrong.
In practice what matters is not the extreme cases, but rather the answer
to the question: which outcomes are considered gerrymandered? McGhee
and Stephanopolous proposed the cut-off |2 · EG | > .16, which we believe
is equally reasonable for REG1 and REG2. Figure 11 shows the set of
outcomes that are considered “allowable” (not gerrymandered) by each of
the three measurements. The measurement 2 ·EG allows outcomes between
the two red lines, while REG1 allows outcomes between the two purple
curves. The measurement REG2 definitely allows outcomes between the
18 KRISTOPHER TAPP
Figure 10. Measurement values along the edges of P
two green regions, and possibly allows outcomes in the green regions (but
only if the election was sufficiently competitive). The key observation is
that REG2 beautifully interpolates between the other two measurements.
The region deemed allowable by both EG and REG1 is definitely allowable
by REG2, while most of the region allowed by only one of {EG,REG1} is
possibly allowed by REG2.
Figure 11. Contours for the cutoffs ±.16
10. Which measurement is best?
In this section, we enumerate some reasons why we think REG2 is ulti-
mately preferable to the other two measurements:
(1) It is a significant weakness that EG is useless in lopsided elections.
In fact we’re not even considering EG2 as a contender because it
exacerbates this weakness. The relative measurements REG1 and
REG2 both essentially solve this problem.
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(2) As discussed in the previous section, we think REG2 has the most
reasonable outputs for extreme elections (along the boundary of P).
(3) The result from Section 6 that EG equals “weighted differential com-
petitiveness” would be a strength, but the weighting adds an un-
pleasant technical complication. A judge might be more impressed
(and less confused) by evidence of an unweighed competitiveness gap,
especially if this evidence is presented as independent from whichever
wasted-vote measurement is used.
(4) As discussed in Section 6, the choice λ = 2 (rather than λ = 1) is
preferable because a district competitiveness cutoff of 1/3 is more
reasonable than 1/2. Even though REG1 (respectively REG2) is not
additive over the districts, it is still true that any district won with
75% (respectively 66%) of the vote is neutral in the sense that both
parties have the same number of wasted votes. We consider the 66%
option more reasonable.
(5) The choice λ = 2 (rather than λ = 1) is preferable because it gen-
eralizes correctly to multi-party elections. If there is only a small
“spoiler” third party, then a partisan map maker has incentive to
carve out districts in which the preferred party has over 50% of the
vote (as modeled in [8]). But to incorporate general multi-party elec-
tions, including those with many parties of roughly the same size,
we believe that the only reasonable definition of an excess vote is: a
vote beyond the number received by the second place party in the
district. This definition reduces to λ = 2 when there are only two
parties.
(6) Even though REG1 is a nonlinear function of Vm and Sm, the fact
that if vanishes when Vm = Sm might lead a judge to conclude that
it “just measures the lack of proportionality,” which would be legally
problematic because parties do not have a right to proportional rep-
resentation. The measurements EG and REG2 are immune to this
potential concern.
(7) EG is battle tested. If one wishes to switch to a relative measurement
at this point, REG2 is preferable to REG1 because it is a smaller
step away from EG. The illustrations of the previous section show
senses in which REG2 interpolates between EG and REG1.
11. McGhee’s efficiency principle
McGhee compared EG, REG1 and REG2 in [8], but he showed much
less enthusiasm than us for REG2, primarily because it failed his efficiency
principle: a gerrymander detection measurement must increase when party
A increases its seat share without any corresponding increase in its vote
share.
If the measurement is a smooth function of (Vm,Sm) ∈ P, McGhee’s
efficiency principle is equivalent to having a positive partial derivative with
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respect to Sm. The global formulas for EG and REG1 have this property, but
these formulas were derived assuming the equal turnout hypothesis. McGhee
generalized these formulas to remove this hypothesis, and he showed that
the generalizations failed his efficiency principle. The basic problem is this:
a partisan map making team will try to (if possible) carve out small-turnout
districts in which their preferred party wins “at small cost,” and none of
EG, REG1 or REG2 would penalize them for doing so. Veomett studied
how extremely EG fails the principle in the presence of malapportionment
(unequal voter turnout) [14], while McGhee observed in [8] that the formula
EG = Sm − 2 · Vm remains true for malapportioned elections, provided one
adopts a reasonable alternative definition of “excess vote.”
Malapportionment is perhaps a minor issue because a partisan map maker
has limited ability to control or take advantage of it. A more significant issue
is that REG2 fails the efficiency principle even assuming the equal turnout
hypothesis. But we agree with Cover’s argument in [3] that this is not
necessarily a problem. REG2 only allows a partisan map making team to
improve their seat share (without increasing vote share) if they make the
districts more competitive and thereby risk losing seats to bad luck.
To better understand McGhee’s efficiency principle, we next prove that it
essentially requires the measurement to depend only on (Vm,Sm). For this,
we require a formal definition.
Definition 11.1. A gerrymander detection measurement is a func-
tion, E , from the set of all n-tuples of pairs of positive integers
D = ((V A1 , V B1 ), ..., (V An , V Bn ))
(for all n ∈ N) to [−1, 1], satisfying:
H1: The indexing of the districts is irrelevant; that is, E(D) is unchanged
when the n elements of D are permuted.
H2: The parties are treated equally; that is, E(D) = −E(D′) if D′ is
obtained from D by swapping the A- and B-components of each of
the n elements.
H3: Voter scalability; that is, E(m · D) = E(D), where m · D denote
the result of multiplying both the A- and B- components of all n
elements of D by the arbitrary positive integer m.
H4: District scalability; that is, for all m ∈ N, E(D) = E (D ∪ · · · ∪ D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m copies
,
where this mn-tuple has m copies of each of the n elements of D.
This list of properties is very minimal and is satisfied by all measurements
considered in this paper. McGhee’s efficiency principle can be precisely
formulated as follows: If D1,D2 have same number of districts and the same
value of Vm, but D2 has a larger value of Sm, then E(D2) > E(D1).
If E is a gerrymander detection measurement, define Emin, Emax : P →
[−1, 1] to be like the silver and gold functions graphed in Figure 8. More
MEASURING POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 21
precisely, if (a, b) ∈ P is has rational coordinates, then
Emin(a, b) = inf{E(D) | D is such that Vm = a and Sm = b},
while the value of Emin on an irrational point is defined as its lim inf on
converging sequences of rational points. The function Emax is defined anal-
ogously.
Proposition 11.2. If a gerrymander detection measurement E satisfies
McGhee’s efficiency principle, then the region between the graphs of Emin
and Emax has zero volume.
Proof sketch. If the region has non-zero volume, then it contains a cube.
From this, it is straightforward to find a pair D1,D2 which (after applying
H4 so they have the same number of districts) contradict the efficiency
principle. 
Example 11.3. Let E be the symmetry measurement discussed in Section
4, namely twice the height of the simulated seats-votes curve above (0, 0) in
the VmSm-plane. It is straightforward to show that:
Emin(Vm,Sm) =
{
0 if Vm > 0
2 · Sm if Vm < 0
, Emax(Vm,Sm) =
{
2 · Sm if Vm > 0
1 if Vm < 0
,
because monotonicity is the only general restriction on a seats-votes curve.
Proposition 11.2 implies that the measurement fails the efficiency princi-
ple. McGhee exhibited explicit examples of this failure in [7] and [8]. This
measurement does satisfies the much weaker hypothesis that Emin and Emax
individually are monotonically nondecreasing in Sm (as do all measurements
considered in this paper). It would be reasonable to add this unassuming
hypothesis to Definition 11.1
McGhee’s principle essentially requires a measurement to be a function
of (Vm,Sm) ∈ P, except possibly on a set of measure zero. We consider this
very restrictive. Although it is interesting to ask about the best function on
P, it is also necessary to build a framework that includes more general mea-
surements. We consider it a benefit (not a drawback) that REG2 depends on
C in addition to (Vm,Sm). Another important measurement that fails the
principle is E = CB − CA (unweighted differential competitiveness) which
could be used in tandem with REG2 as independent supporting evidence.
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